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Administrative Mandamus as a





The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' Since the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 1922,2 land
use regulations can violate the Takings Clause if the use of property is
so severely restricted as to effectively usurp private ownership rights.3
The law of regulatory takings laid virtually dormant for more than
half a century after its inception in Pennsylvania Coal. Since 1978,
however, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed land use regu-
lations challenged under the Takings Clause on 14 occasions,4 sparking
* Senior Attorney, Zumbrun, Best & Findley, Sacramento, California. B.A., Univer-
sity of California at Davis; J.D., McGeorge School of Law. Ms. Browne was lead at-
torney for the plaintiff in Healing v. California Coastal Commission. Helpful com-
ments, suggestions, and assistance in the development of this article were provided
by R. S. Radford.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an overall analysis of how the Takings Clause and
its interpretation have changed over time, reflecting the Supreme Court's attitude to-
ward the relationship between individuals, society and the environment see Michael
Niederbach, Transferable Public Rights: Reconciling Public Rights and Private Prop-
erty, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 899, 899 (1988-89).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a Pennsylvania statute designed to prevent
mine subsidence was an unconstitutional use of police power).
3. "[Wjhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. However, Justice Holmes never
indicated when a regulation went too far and became a taking. Niederbach, supra
note 1, at 904.
4. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
intense interest in this previously obscure field of constitutional law.'
The Supreme Court's core analytical rule for regulatory takings was
set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon:6 a property regulation violates
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987); Federal Comm. Comm'n v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
5. See, e.g., R. S. Radford, Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric: Broadening
the Terms of Debate, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (1994); Richard C. Ausness, Wild
Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline Protec-
tion Programs, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 437 (1993); AFrER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION
AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION (David L. Callies, ed. 1993);
William C. Leigh & Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Governmental Zoning Practices and
the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause Formulation: Timing, Value, and R.LB.E.,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1993); James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Spe-
cies, Wetlands, and Other Critters: Is It Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?,
27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992); Steven J. Eagle & William H. Mellor, III, Regu-
latory Takings After the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An Evolving Return to
Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 209 (1992); R. S. Radford, Regulatory Takings
Law in the 1990s: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1019 (1992); Law-
rence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of the Mount
Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991); Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal
Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the
"Takings Trilogy", 44 ARK. L. REV. 65 (1991); Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Fu-
ture: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV.
139 (1990); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court
Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988);
William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court
Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1988); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to
Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understand-
ing of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630
(1988); Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory 'Takings' Revisited: The New Su-
preme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Takings:
Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1; James L. Huffman, Avoiding the
Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and
Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVT'L. L. 171 (1987); RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985);
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Bernard H. Siegan, The Anomaly of Regulation under the
Taking Clause, reprinted in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES 1 (1977).
6. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of two local
ordinances, which limited the number of homes that could be built on their land. Id.
at 258.
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the Takings Clause if it fails to advance a substantially legitimate state
interest or denies the owner all economically viable use of the proper-
ty.
7
This two-part test has been frequently reiterated in regulatory takings
decisions since Agins,8 and the High Court has struck down land use
regulations for offending either prong of the Agins standard. In Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission,' the Supreme Court invalidated a
regulation that failed to substantially advance legitimate interests with-
out regard to its economic impact on the property owners." Converse-
ly, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," the Court held that a
landowner was entitled to compensation if an admittedly legitimate
regulation deprived him of economically viable use of his land.12
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to lay down minimum uniform
standards for regulatory takings law, the state courts have followed
widely divergent paths in applying these teachings. 3 To the disappoint-
ment and frustration of property owners, the California courts-despite
being pointedly reversed by the Supreme Court in both Nollan and
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles l4-remain among the most hostile to private ownership
rights.'5
7. Id. at 260. For a further discussion of the Agins test, see generally Ausness,
supra note 5.
8. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94; Pennell, 485 U.S. at 18; Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484; Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126; San Die-
go Gas, 450 U.S. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the plaintiffs challenged the California Coastal
Commission's condition on their permit that required the plaintiffs to convey an ease-
ment to the state granting public access to the entire beach area of the plaintiffs' lot,
which was approximately one-third of their land. Id. at 828.
10. Id. at 839. For a further discussion of the Nottan decision, see generally Timo-
thy Bittle, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: You Can't Always Get What
You Want, But Sometimes You Get What You Need, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 345 (1988) and
articles, supra note 5.
11. 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992) (determining whether a South Carolina statute that
prevented almost any building on beachfront property was unconstitutional and a
regulatory taking). For a further discussion of the Lucas decision see generally Eagle
& Mellor, supra note 5.
12. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
13. See, e.g., Radford, Land Use Regulation and Legal Rhetoric, supra note 5, at
417-18.
14. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
15. See DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 11 (1993) (naming California as the "near unanimous"
NoUan and Lucas eroded the state courts' ability to uphold restrictive
land use regulations on their merits.'6 Some California courts, however,
responded to this development by invoking novel procedural require-
ments to impede the prosecution of regulatory takings claims by injured
landowners. 7
In a line of decisions handed down in the wake of Nollan, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals held that property owners may not seek compen-
sation for regulatory takings unless they first establish that the offend-
ing regulation is invalid.'" This requirement reflects profound confusion
at both doctrinal and procedural levels. Doctrinally, the California
courts have blurred the two independent prongs of the Agins standard.
At the same time, actions for inverse condemnation (the procedure for
seeking compensation) have been conflated with petitions for adminis-
trative mandamus (the most common procedure for invalidating a regu-
lation)."
The potential procedural chaos arising from the merger of these two
distinct causes of action is of critical importance to property owners. In
California, administrative mandamus is a limited judicial proceeding
that must be brought promptly upon the enactment or decision that
gives rise to a taking." The State of California has taken the position
that an adverse ruling in the mandamus proceeding (i.e., upholding the
validity of the regulation) should foreclose any liability for a regulatory
taking.2' If an injured property owner cannot establish the invalidity of
a regulation via the limited forum of administrative mandamus, she
would be barred from seeking compensation by way of inverse condem-
nation. Thus, by failing to recognize the essential distinctions between
inverse condemnation and administrative mandamus, the California
courts devised a rule that foreclosed to many citizens their constitu-
tional right to just compensation for regulatory takings.
On July 25, 1994, the California Supreme Court addressed the proce-
dural requirements of regulatory takings claims for the first time in
choice of land use specialists as the state least likely to protect owners' constitu-
tional rights).
16. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 7591 and accompanying text.
18. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Superior Court, 258 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (Ct.
App. 1989); Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736, 744 (Ct. App. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990). See infra Section III for a review of these deci-
sions and their progeny.
19. See infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Healing v. California Coastal Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 762 (Ct.
App. 1994).
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fifteen years in Hensler v. City of Glendale.' On the surface, Hensler
dealt only with the narrow issue of whether a developer has complied
with the appropriate statute of limitations in challenging a restrictive
city ordinance. In fact, however, the Hensler decision substantially
revised the procedural guidelines for litigating regulatory takings claims
in California.
Justice Baxter's unanimous opinion in Hensler skillfully weaved to-
gether an assortment of appellate decisions and unified them under the
rubric of long-standing Supreme Court doctrine and constitutional man-
dates. A crucial element in this elaborate reconciliation was the Hensler
court's citation-and strong endorsement-of a recent decision of the
Second Appellate District, Healing v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.' As the California Attorney General loudly complained, Healing
was not even decided until after most of the briefing had been submit-
ted in Hensler.' Nevertheless, the state supreme court recognized that
the Healing decision held the key to imposing stringent procedural
restrictions on regulatory takings claims while still maintaining the
protections guaranteed to property owners under the Takings Clause.
This article will review in greater depth the distinctions in purpose
and scope between actions for inverse condemnation and petitions for
administrative writs,25 trace the blending of these two very different
instruments by the California courts,26 and show how this policy has
subverted constitutional rights in California. 7 Special attention will
then be turned to the key California Court of Appeal decision in Heal-
ing and its role in shaping the doctrine of the California Supreme Court
as revealed in Hensler.28
II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS ARE
FUNDAMENTALLY INCOMPATIBLE PROCEEDINGS
The issue of whether a regulatory takings claim must be raised by
way of administrative mandamus involves more than mere legal form.
22. 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994).
23. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994).
24. Amicus letter brief of the State of California dated August 9, 1994, urging the
California Supreme Court to grant rehearing or modification of Hensler to delete
references to Healing.
25. See infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 52-97 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 128-174 and accompanying text.
Inverse condemnation actions and administrative mandamus proceed-
ings pursue entirely different ends. Administrative mandamus looks to
the legitimacy of a regulatory agency's decision.' The proceeding fo-
cuses on such questions as the nature of the hearing, whether discre-
tion was abused and whether the agency acted improperly under state
law. Inverse condemnation, in contrast, is an action brought by an own-
er "to recover damages for injury to his property from [the govern-
ment]."' In other words,, administrative mandamus seeks to have a
regulatory action struck down as invalid, while inverse condemnation
seeks compensation for the effect of the regulation on the property
owner's rights, whether or not the regulation is valid.
A. Administrative Mandamus
In California, a challenge to the validity of a land use regulation must
be brought by either a declaratory relief action or a petition for manda-
mus, depending on whether the regulation is challenged on its face or
as applied. To bring a facial challenge to a legislative enactment, an
aggrieved property owner must seek declaratory relief" In the far
more common instance of challenging an action or decision as applied
to a particular plaintiff, however, a writ of administrative mandamus is
the only route to invalidation.' The aggrieved party must normally file
a writ petition within ninety days following the final administrative deci-
sion (commonly the denial or conditioning of a discretionary permit).'
In some circumstances, however, the applicable statute of limitations is
even shorter.'
Administrative mandamus is an extremely narrow statutory procedure
designed to "attack, review, set aside, void or annul" adjudicatory deci-
sions of state or local governmental bodies.35 Judicial review is
29. 8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 987 (1988)
(defining administrative mandamus as "[alttacks on the validity of a resolution").
30. 8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1057 (1988); see also BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed. 1990) (inverse condemnation: "[a] cause of action
against a government agency to recover the value of property taken by the agency").
31. See State v. Superior Court, 524 P. 2d 1281, 1290 (Cal. 1974) (citing McCarthy
v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932, 933-34 (Cal.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817
(1954)).
32. Id.
33. See Patrick Media Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
824, 833 (Ct. App. 1992). See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66499.37 (West 1983); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1094.6(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
34. When the California Coastal Commission is the agency whose decision or ac-
tion is challenged, the writ petition must be filed within 60 days after the decision
becomes final. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994). See also Youngblood
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available only to establish the regulatory agency's abuse of discretion.
This requires a showing that the agency has not proceeded in the man-
ner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the find-
ings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.'
In determining whether the regulatory body abused its discretion, the
reviewing court normally applies a substantial evidence standard of
review. Under this criterion, great deference is extended to the regula-
tors. The court merely determines whether (1) substantial evidence
exists to support the agency's findings and (2) the findings are legally
sufficient to uphold the challenged decision.' The decision will be
struck down only if the court determines that the findings are not sup-
ported "by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record."' All
reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of the agency;' the court will
not apply its own judgment in place of the regulators'. '
Only when a regulation substantially affects a fundamental vested
right does the independent judgment standard apply.4 Under this stan-
dard the court carries out its normal fact-finding procedures of weigh-
ing the evidence and reaching its own conclusion. Unfortunately, the
independent judgment test is not available in most land use disputes
because California courts do not regard the development of private
property as a fundamental vested right.'
v. Board of Supervisors, 586 P.2d 556, 559 n.2 (Cal. 1974).
36. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
37. See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d
12, 14 (Cal. 1974); McMillan v. American Gen. Fin. Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 462, 466 (Ct.
App. 1976).
38. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
39. See Topanga, 522 P.2d at 16; Paoli v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr.
792, 795 (Ct. App. 1986).
40. See McMiUan, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
41. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 520 P.2d 29,
33 (Cal. 1974) (fundamental vested rights are any rights which have been "legitimately
acquired" and are economically or otherwise "importan[t] . . . to the individual in the
life situation"); Bixby v. Pierno, 481 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1971) (when a person already
possesses something of value, he has a "fundamental vested right" which requires
judicial oversight in the form of independent judgment review); 301 Ocean Ave. Corp.
v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 279 Cal. Rptr. 636, 640 (Ct. App. 1991); see also
Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 657 P.2d 383 (Cal. 1983); Drummey v.
State Bd. of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 87 P.2d 848 (Cal. 1939).
42. See Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 220 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct.
App. 1985); City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918 (CL App.
1982). There have been rare exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., Goat Hill Tav-
ern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (Ct. App. 1992) (owner has vested
Under no circumstances will the issues adjudicated at an administra-
tive hearing receive a trial de novo in the reviewing court.' Regardless
of the standard of review, the only evidence normally received in an
administrative mandamus proceeding is the administrative record."
B. Inverse Condemnation
Unlike the statutorily created mandamus proceeding, inverse condem-
nation is a constitutionally-based action to obtain just compensation for
a taking.45 The inverse condemnation action is based on the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment," which is "self-executing" with re-
spect to compensation.
The only issues in an inverse condemnation action are whether a
plaintiffs property was taken by excessive regulation and if so, what
"just compensation" is required. Whether a taking has occurred is a
mixed question of law and fact to be determined by a trial judge.4 The
amount of compensation that should be awarded is entirely a factual is-
sue to be determined by a jury."
Historically, invalidation of the offending regulation has not been an
issue in inverse condemnation since the cause of action is designed "to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
fundamental right to continue operating tavern under conditional use permit); 301
Ocean Avenue Corp. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 279 Cal. Rptr. 636 (Ct.
App. 1991) (landlord has fundamental vested right to control use of property for
assigned parking).
43. Continuing Education of the Bar, California Administrative Mandamus § 4.121
(2d ed. 1989).
44. Id. This record may be augmented only in two limited instances: (1) when
relevant evidence is offered that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not
have been produced at the hearing, or (2) when relevant evidence was improperly
excluded at the hearing. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(e) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
45. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See generally 29 CAL. JuR. 3D Emi-
nent Domain § 30140 (1986). The underlying purpose of the Takings Clause is "to
distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the
making of public improvements." 29 CAL JUR. 3D Eminent Domain § 303 (1986).
46. 29 CAL. JUR. 3D (REv.), Eminent Domain § 302 (Gene A. Noland et al. eds.,
1986). The Takings Clause has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment since Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
The California Constitution has a similar provision requiring just compensation for the
taking of property by the government. CAL. CONsT., art. I, § 19. The state provision
includes compensation for "damaging" as well as "taking" private property. Id. This
difference has been construed to protect property interests to a greater degree than
federal law. Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 572 P.2d 43, 51 (Cal. 1977).
47. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Country of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 315 (1987).
48. See, e.g., People v. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d 799, 805 (Cal. 1943).
49. Id.
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amounting to a taking." ' Moreover, invalidation has traditionally been
considered a remedy for due process violations;' the remedy for a tak-
ing-pursued via inverse condemnation-is compensation. Similarly,
questions of abusing discretion, exceeding jurisdiction and complying
with state law do not arise in inverse condemnation because they have
been perceived as irrelevant to the inquiry of whether compensation is
due.
III. INTO THE QUAGMIRE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FLAWED DOCTRINE BY
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS
A. Veta/Agins/First English
The confused merger of administrative mandamus and inverse con-
demnation in California began innocently enough." Nearly twenty
years ago, in State v. Superior Court (Veta),u the California Supreme
Court drew a procedural distinction between facial and as-applied chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of government regulations.' The Veta
court acknowledged that declaratory relief is an appropriate vehicle for
facial challenges to statutory enactments.n When the validity of an ad-
ministrative action or decision is at issue, however, Veta held that relief
must be sought via administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 1094.5.' Although Veta did not involve an inverse con-
demnation claim, it laid the groundwork for a series of decisions that
would dramatically affect the rights of property owners throughout the
state.
50. First English, 482 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund State
and Local Government Infrastructure Improvements and Affordable Housing?, 23
REAL. EST. L. J. 7, 15 n.52 (1994); William W. Merrill, III & Robert K. Lincoln, Link-
age Fees and Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW 223, 242-43
n.89 (1993).
52. Bringing a regulatory taking claim to trial in California involves an administra-
tive 'shell game' and a judicial 'minefield' to trap the unwary practioner. For a gener-
al overview of the trial court procedures in California in permit cases as of 1992, see
generally Sharon Browne, Mandamus or Inverse Condemnation?-Special Problems
in Permit Cases, C730 ALI-ABA 35 (1992).
53. 524 P.2d 1281, 1290-93 (Cal. 1974).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1293.
56. Id. at 1290.
Five years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,57 the California Su-
preme Court drew on Veta to bar a landowner from challenging a con-
fiscatory zoning ordinance by bringing an inverse condemnation suit.'
The Agins court held that owners could seek to invalidate such regula-
tions under the Fifth Amendment, but a claim for compensation via in-
verse condemnation was not available as a remedy.
[A] landowner alleging that a zoning ordinance has deprived him of substantially
all use of his land may attempt through declaratory relief or mandamus to invali-
date the ordinance as excessive regulation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 19, of the California Constitu-
tion. He may not, however, elect to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby
transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taldng for which
compensation in eminent domain must be paid.'
In reaching this conclusion, Agins recognized that inverse condemna-
tion suits for invalidation are two different legal responses to excessive
regulation.' However, the court seemed to imply that a constitutionally
valid regulation can never trigger the just compensation requirement of
the Takings Clause by depriving an owner of beneficial use of his proper-
ty. The Agins court apparently devised a Catch-22 whereby a suit for
compensation through inverse condemnation could never succeed. By
the logic of Agins, if a challenged regulation is unconstitutional, it is ipso
facto invalid. But if the measure is invalid, the proper remedy is not com-
pensation but invalidation via administrative mandamus (or declaratory
relief, for a facial challenge).6
The Agins opinion was quickly applied throughout California's judicial
system to deprive property owners of their constitutional remedy of just
compensation for regulatory takings.' At times, it seemed as if a gaunt-
let had been thrown. As one appellate panel put it, "While the United
States Supreme Court may eventually conclude that California cannot
limit the remedy available for a taking to nonmonetary relief, it has not
yet done so, and this court is obligated to follow Agins."'
This tension came to a head in First English Evangelical Lutheran
57. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
58. Id. at 28-32.
59. Id. at 28.
60. Id. See supra notes 29-51 for a discussion of the differences between inverse
condemnation and administrative mandamus, which is a suit for invalidation.
61. Agins, 598 P. 2d at 28.
62. See, e.g., Guinnane v. City & County of San Francisco, 241 Cal. Rptr. 787, 788
(Ct. App. 1987); Walter H. Leimert Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 196 Cal. Rptr.
739, 745 (Ct. App. 1983); Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77
(Ct. App. 1981); Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247, 251 (Ct.
App. 1980).
63. Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 196 (Ct.
App. 1982).
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Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles." In First English, the
California Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, held that allega-
tions of a regulatory taking did not state a cause of action for inverse
condemnation.' In a challenge to a building moratorium brought by a
Glendale church, Los Angeles County moved to strike the church's alle-
gations that it had been denied all economically viable use of its land.
The trial court granted the motion and was upheld on appeal, reasoning
that Agins rendered such issues "entirely immaterial and irrelevant [with]
no bearing upon any conceivable cause of action herein."' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied First English's petition for review.
B. The Supreme Court's Response
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in First English67
and tossed a bombshell into the California judiciary. Reversing the state
court of appeal, the High Court carefully spelled out the role of the Tak-
ings Clause and inverse condemnation in the tension between property
rights and the regulatory state: "[The Takings Clause] does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the
exercise of that power."'
That condition, the Court continued, is the "constitutional obligation to
pay just compensation" for governmental takings of private property
rights.' The compensation requirement was underscored by the Court's
emphasis that the Fifth Amendment is not a mechanism for invalidating
regulations."0 Rather, an injured property owner is entitled to bring an
action in inverse condemnation as a result of "the self-executing
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensa-
tion."
64. Unpublished disposition, California Court of Appeal (1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 308.
67. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). For a further discussion of the First English decision see
generally supra note 5.
68. First English, 482 U.S. at 314.
69. Id. at 315 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
70. "This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed
not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a
taking." First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
71. Id. (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
As if fearful that its point would be missed, the First English Court
reviewed the origin of and constitutional basis for inverse condemnation:
[Inverse condemnation] suits were based on the right to recover just compen-
sation for property taken by the United States for public use in the exercise of its
power of eminent domain. That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The
fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right was
asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim.
The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. Statutory recognition was not necessary .... Such a promise was implied
because of the duty to pay imposed by the Amendment. The suits were thus
founded upon the Constitution of the United States.'
A clear implication of First English is that inverse condemnation can-
not be used to invalidate governmental intrusions on property. Agins was
doctrinally sound on this point when it held that the proper tools for
invalidating governmental acts under the Fifth Amendment are manda-
mus and declaratory relief.' However, the California courts erred in
applying Agins to foreclose inverse condemnation where compensation
for a taking was at issue. On this point, the Supreme Court affirmed that
inverse condemnation as a remedy for a taking is constitutionally guar-
anteed.'
C. Back to the Bog: Ham, Rossco and Their Progeny
To the dismay of the state's property owners, the California courts
promptly doused First English's "bombshell" in a vat of ice water. Unde-
terred by the United States Supreme Court's ruling, the state judiciary
continued to apply the conceptual framework of Agins. Suits seeking
compensation for regulatory actions were still treated as challenges to
the validity of the actions. The state courts recognized they could no
longer deny the availability of inverse condemnation as a matter of
law-but, in a new twist on Agins, a way was found to minimize the sig-
nificance of inverse condemnation as a remedy.
Two years after First English the California Court of Appeal signaled
the new direction in California Coastal Commission v. Superior Court
(Ham).75 In Ham, the Coastal Commission approved a residential build-
ing permit subject to the exaction of a beachfront easement."6 The prop-
erty owner complied with the condition and built his home. Some time
later (but within the five-year statute of limitations for inverse condem-
72. Id. at 316 (quoting Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933)) (latter empha-
sis added).
73. See Agins, 598 P.2d at 28.
74. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
75. 258 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Ct. App. 1989).
76. Id. The facts of Ham are virtually identical to those of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, in which the Supreme Court found a regulatory taking.
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nation) the, owner sued, alleging that the exaction amounted to a regula-
tory taking of his property. The court of appeal ruled that the inverse
condemnation action was barred because the owner had failed to file his
inverse condemnation claim with a petition for writ of administrative
mandamus.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Ham court acknowledged that in First
English, "the Supreme Court held that an inverse condemnation remedy
for a temporary taking was constitutionally mandated."' However, the
High Court had said nothing about when the takings claim must be filed.
Citing to no authority, Ham continued:
Quite clearly, a property owner seeking to recover on an inverse condemnation
claim against the Commission in a case such as this must first establish the in-
validity of the condition the Commission sought to impose. An administrative
mandate proceeding provides the proper vehicle for such a challenge.'
How the Ham court could consider this novel procedural rule to be
"quite clear" is a lingering source of puzzlement to legal scholars. The
holding has obvious roots in Agins and California's subsequent emphasis
on invalidation instead of compensation as the sole remedy for a taking.
The requirement of invalidation as a precondition to compensation was,
however, entirely new.'
A few months after Ham, the court of appeal decided Rossco Hold-
ings, Inc. v. State,' which involved another suit against the state and
the Coastal Commission over conditions imposed-on the development of
plaintiffs' land. The owners in Rossco did not file a petition for an admin-
istrative writ, arguing that they could not be compelled to do so under
the Fifth Amendment. The appellate panel disagreed, holding that the
plaintiffs had waived their right to inverse condemnation by failing to
pursue administrative mandamus "prior to, or in conjunction with," their
claim.'
Like Ham, the Rossco court characterized a regulatory takings claim as
an effort to invalidate an administrative act: "Regardless of whether [the
77. Id. at 569-70.
78. Id. at 570.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Significantly, the Ham court was unable to provide a single citation to statu-
tory or case law in support of its innovative procedural doctrine.
81. 260 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1989).
82. Id. at 737. The effect is an inverse condemnation suit must be filed within the
same time period allowed for filing a mandamus action. Browne, supra note 52, at
44.
owner] pleads its cause of action as one for inverse condemnation or as
a denial of due process, the essential underpinning of its recovery is the
invalidity of the administrative action. That action must be reviewed
by petition for writ of administrative mandate."' Rossco went beyond
Ham in proposing for the first time that an administrative mandamus
hearing could provide an adequate forum not only to establish the validi-
ty of a regulation, but also to determine whether a regulatory taking had
occurred.'
The court of appeal fully embraced this troubling suggestion in Patrick
Media Group v. California Coastal Commission.' The Patrick Media
court began by reiterating the familiar theme that an inverse condemna-
tion action seeks to invalidate the challenged regulation or decision: "The
gravamen of a challenge based upon inverse condemnation is that the
administrative action was invalid insofar as it did not provide for pay-
ment of compensation."' While reaffirming that an injured property
owner must bring a claim for damages via a petition for administrative
mandate, the Patrick Media court recast the law of takings in a startling
light:
ITihe general rule requiring a challenge to an administrative action to be raised by
way of administrative mandate applies whether (1) the challenger's claim is that
the action was invalid and should be cancelled, or (2) the claim is that the action
resulted in a taking of property .... In either case, the essential underpinning of
the challenge is the invalidity of the administrative action.87
This remarkable passage seems to imply that the constitutionally guaran-
teed remedy of inverse condemnation actions has been subsumed within
California's administrative writ procedures. Compensation for a taking
was no longer to be accorded procedural autonomy as a separate and
distinct cause of action.
It was quickly demonstrated that the foregoing was not a strained
interpretation of Patrick Media. In Tensor Group v. City of Glendale,'
property owners challenged a selective building moratorium by petition-
ing for an administrative writ and succeeded in invalidating the mea-
sure.' When they followed up their success with an inverse condemna-
tion claim, however, their complaint was dismissed on grounds of res
judicata.' The court of appeal affirmed, holding that any evidence of
83. Rossco, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (emphasis added) (citing Ham, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
570).
84. Id. at 745.
85. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Ct. App. 1992).
86. Id. at 834 (citing Rossco, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 740).
87. Patrick Media, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (citations omitted).
88. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1993).
89. Id. at 640.
90. Id. at 640.
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damages had to be submitted during the mandamus proceeding." The
constitutional sufficiency of the writ proceedings to dispose of an inverse
condemnation claim was simply assumed without discussion.
D. Summary
The trend of California takings law over the past two decades is clear.
From Veta's holding that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for an
as-applied challenge to an administrative act's validity, it was a short step
to Agins' conclusion that invalidation-not compensation-is the proper
remedy for a regulatory taking.' The state courts did not shrink from
pressing this doctrine to its ultimate conclusion by foreclosing inverse
condemnation to regulatory takings claimants altogether.
California's appellate courts quickly accommodated the Supreme
Court's stinging repudiation of this doctrine in First English. In Ham,
the court tied inverse condemnation to the short statute of limitations for
administrative writ petitions,' and in Rossco it was proposed that the
writ hearing could adequately dispose of the takings claim altogether.'
This suggestion became a command in Patrick Media,' and in the Ten-
sor decision it was determined that evidence relevant to compensation
would be barred if not introduced in the agency proceedings and incor-
porated into the administrative record.'
Throughout this doctrinal odyssey, the courts have been guided by the
goal of minimizing the exposure of California governments to financial
liability for regulatory takings.97 However, this objective has been
91. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
92. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. 1979), offd, 477 U.S. 255
(1980), overruled by, First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
93. California Coastal Conun'n v. Superior Court (Ham), 258 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570
(Ct. App. 1989).
94. Rossco Holdings v. State, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736, 745 (Ct. App. 1989).
95. Patrick Media Group v. California Coastal Comm'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 834
(Ct. App. 1992).
96. Tensor Group v. City of Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1993).
97. The Ham court fretted that if injured citizens were allowed to pursue inverse
condemnation claims for regulatory takings, "the financial burden on the state could
be overwhelming." Ham, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 570. In Patrick Media, the court worried
that recognizing the full statutory five-year limitations period would mean that "mean-
ingful governmental fiscal planning would become impossible." Patrick Media, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 836 (citations omitted). These concerns flow directly from the California
Supreme Court's preoccupation in Agins with "the inhibiting financial force which
achieved at heavy expense to other, arguably more fundamental, val-
ues-notably the constitutional rights of California property owners.
IV. THE PROBLEMS: WHY ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE AS A
PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE TAKINGS LIABILITY
Six years after the Supreme Court's intervention in First English,'
California courts developed a doctrine nearly as onerous to property
owners as their earlier refusal to recognize inverse condemnation as a
remedy for a regulatory taking.' By 1993, inverse condemnation in such
cases had been reduced to little more than a theoretical curiosity. Before
compensation could be considered, injured property owners were re-
quired to seek invalidation within the ninety day (or shorter) statute of
limitations for administrative mandamus." The outcome of this limited
proceeding would then be dispositive as to the takings issue."'
This policy, it should be noted, was not without supporters. A leading
authority on California land use law, for example, described the rule as
serving the "salutory purpose of promptly alerting the agency that its
decision is being questioned and that it may be liable for inverse con-
demnation damage.""° Why this burden should be placed on the individ-
ual whose property is taken is not disclosed.
As Justice Brennan once remarked, it does not seem unreasonable to
expect government officials-who have constant access to specialized
legal counsel at taxpayer expense-to be familiar with the content of the
United States Constitution."° It seems especially curious to place the
burden of education on the victims. While it may be true that the state
finds "salutory" benefits in subordinating inverse condemnation to man-
damus, these benefits must be balanced against the costs to individuals
who are injured by confiscatory regulations. The heaviest of these costs
is the effective forfeiture of basic constitutional protections.
The procedural quagmire created by California's appellate courts in the
inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy." Agins, 598 P.2d at 31 (emphasis add-
ed).
98. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
100. Tensor Group v. City of Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 n.I (Ct. App.
1993).
101. Id. at 639.
102. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAw 213 (14th ed.
1994). The cited rationale is repeated almost verbatim from the Ham opinion. Id.
103. "[Ilf a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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aftermath of First English rested on the premise that administrative
mandamus is an acceptable procedure to determine whether citizens'
rights have been violated under the Fifth Amendment.1" In fact, manda-
mus proceedings are not constitutionally adequate for this purpose, This
section outlines three of the chief problems with the California doctrine:
plaintiffs do not receive basic due process safeguards in the administra-
tive procedures that create the record for review in a mandamus action;
this deficient record is then subjected to an inadequate standard of re-
view; and takings claims must be rushed into court under an unduly
short statute of limitations.
A. The Due Process Problem
Before a federal constitutional takings issue can be resolved against a
property owner, certain fundamental requirements of due process must
be met. At a minimum, the aggrieved party should be entitled to an
inquiry before a judicial officer where witnesses can be subpoenaed and
testify under oath, where cross-examination of witnesses is allowed, and
where discovery is permitted."'5
Under existing California law, this type of inquiry is not available in an
administrative mandamus proceeding in a land use case. The administra-
tive record-the only evidence normally before a reviewing court-is
usually derived from proceedings lacking any significant due process
safeguards. This record is developed not under the guidance of a neutral
judge but during hearings conducted by one of the parties to the antici-
pated litigation. Consequently, there frequently may be little concern for
the reliability of the fact-finding process.
Even granting the best of intentions to the regulating agency, it will
usually be logically impossible to determine from the administrative
record whether a taking has occurred. It is axiomatic that "[a] court can-
not determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows
how far the regulation goes."'" Yet the impact of a regulatory decision
104. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
105. "Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agen-
cies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial
process." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); accord McLeod v. Board of
Pension Comm'rs of Los Angeles, 94 Cal. Rptr. 58, 61 (Ct. App. 1970).
106. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). A
regulation that "goes too far" is considered a taking under the fifth amendment.
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See supra note 3 and accom-
or enactment with respect to any given property owner cannot be deter-
mined until after final action is taken by the government.' ° Thus, it is
not possible for a trial court to resolve this issue by reviewing an admin-
istrative record developed prior to and concurrently with the final action
of the agency.
The Rossco court tried to finesse this problem by likening a mandamus
proceeding to the first phase of an inverse condemnation action." The
superficial resemblance-in both cases the trial judge determines as a
question of law and fact whether there has been a taking-is entirely
spurious. Whether a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of her constitu-
tional rights cannot reliably be established in a proceeding in which the
court's inquiry is limited to the record developed by an adverse party,
without due process safeguards, whose deliberations concluded before
the taking occurred.
B. The Standard of Review Problem
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held
that heightened scrutiny is required in evaluating regulatory takings
claims.'" The Supreme Court's decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard reit-
erated and strengthened Nollan's requirement of an elevated standard of
review."' Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dolan likened the standard
of review applicable to property regulations challenged under the Tak-
ings Clause to that employed in cases arising under the First Amend-
ment."' Furthermore, the Court spelled out in Dolan what had only
been implied in Nollan: governments enacting regulations challenged
under the Takings Clause must bear the burden of proving their legiti-
macy.
1 2
One line of California cases had repudiated Nollan's requirement of
heightened scrutiny for regulatory takings, much as the cases reviewed in
the preceding section eviscerated First English."3 However, immediate-
panying text.
107. Id. at 349.
108. Rossco Holdings v. State, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736, 745 (Ct. App. 1989).
109. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 n.3 (overruling the rational basis test employed by
the Whaler's Village court). See also Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the substantial evidence test as
the standard of constitutional review in a "takings" case).
110. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
111. Id. at 2312.
112. Id. at 2311.
113. See Saad v. City of Berkeley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1994) (limit-
ing Nollan doctrine to "possessory" takings); Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 743 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that NoUan's heightened scrutiny applies only to physical takings); City and County of
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ly following its decision in Dolan, the Supreme Court implicitly overruled
these cases by its disposition of a petition for certiorari in Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City."4 Ehrlich involved a challenge to an exaction of
more than $300,000 in fees in exchange for a building permit."5 The
court of appeal upheld the city's demands, ruling that "[m]onetary exac-
tions compelled as a condition of approval need be only rationally re-
lated to the governmental purpose.". The United States Supreme Court
granted Ehrlich's petition for certiorari and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Dolan."7 In so doing, the High Court affirmed that the height-
ened judicial standards mandated by Nollan and Dolan apply to the full
range of intrusive land-use regulations and conditions, not just those in-
volving a transfer of real property.
The relationship between the heightened judicial scrutiny required by
Nollan and Dolan and the appropriate standard of review in passing un
the validity of administrative actions is problematic. It seems implausible
that judges applying the substantial evidence standard in the context of a
limited administrative record-the normal state of affairs in administra-
tive mandamus hearings-could offer meaningful protection to the rights
of property owners. However, it is not evident that the independent
judgment standard would significantly enhance this protection, given that
an adverse party to the record under litigation compiles the record with
few or no constitutional safeguards, prior to the occurrence of the as-
serted taking. The California courts in Ham, Rossco and their progency
either ignored or glossed over these problems.
C. The Statute of Limitations Problem
In California, the statute of limitations for bringing an action in inverse
San Francisco v. Golden Gate Heights Inv., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 469 (Ct. App. 1993).
(holding that Nollan, one of the Supreme Court's leading regulatory takings cases,
does not apply to regulatory takings); Blue Jeans Equities West v. City and County of
San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the heightened
scrutiny test in NoUan is limited to "possessory" rather than regulatory takings cases);
Contra Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 377
(Ct. App. 1991), (acknowledging that "Nollan ... changed the standard of constitu-
tional review in takings cases. Whether the new standard be described as 'substantial
relationship', or 'heightened scrutiny' it is clear the rational basis test ... no longer
controls.").
114. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
115. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993).
116. Id. at 475 (citing Blue Jeans Equities, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Ct. App. 1992)).
117. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
condemnation is five years."' In sharp contrast, petitions for adminis-
trative mandamus must be brought within ninety days or sooner follow-
ing the final administrative decision."9 Under the Ham line of decisions,
an owner who is injured by land-use regulations is required to pursue an
administrative mandamus proceeding as a prerequisite to an inverse con-
demnation claim.2 ' Moreover, the inverse condemnation action itself
may have to be filed within the time frame allowed for the mandamus
action. 2'
If it is recognized that inverse condemnation is a constitutionally guar-
anteed remedy for regulatory takings, it is difficult to see why the five
year statute of limitations should be abridged in such cases. Neverthe-
less, the Ham court ruled that failure to file a writ petition within the
specified time period barred the otherwise timely inverse condemnation
claim.'" Subsequent decisions in this line of cases have been equally as
harsh.
As a practical matter, there may be serious difficulties in bringing an
inverse condemnation action within 90 days of the triggering event. The
property owner must recognize and assess her damages, which in many
cases may seem quite speculative so close on the heels of a permit denial
or similar decision. Specialized counsel must often be secured,'" and
facts and evidence must be marshalled for both an administrative writ
petition and the inverse condemnation complaint.
24
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 318-319 (West 1994); see also Baker v. Burbank-Glen-
dale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 869 (Cal. 1985) (citing Frustuck v. City of
Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1963). The period for seeking compensation for
damage to property is three years. See CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 ) (West 1994).
119. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
120. It is interesting to note that if an agency effects a physical taking of private
property, there is no requirement for administrative mandamus before filing an action
for inverse condemnation.
121. The California courts have been inconsistent on this point. In Golden Cheese
Co., the court of appeal expressly held that an inverse condemnation action against
an administrative agency could be brought subsequent to the administrative mandate
action. Golden Cheese Co. v. Voss, 281 Cal. Rptr. 602, 605 (Ct. App. 1991). As noted
previously however, the Tensor court ruled that such a sequential approach would
bar the inverse condemnation claim under res judicata.
122. California Coastal Comm'n v. Superior Ct. (Ham), 258 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Ct. App.
1989).
123. In addition to the need for an attorney with expertise in inverse condemnation,
there is a sound practical reason why the property owner may be unable to continue
with the same counsel who represented her in the administrative proceedings. Espe-
cially in rural areas, local land use attorneys often decline to pursue takings claims
against the boards and agencies before whom they must appear and with whom they
must work on a regular basis.
124. The 90-day period for filing a petition for administrative mandamus can be ex-
tended if the property owner requests a copy of the administrative record within 10
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Many property owners will be unable to meet these stringent dead-
lines. At what point do these practical hurdles become so onerous as to
infringe unconstitutionally on the right to compensation for a taking? The
California courts overlooked or ignored this question in their concern to
assure that local governments are promptly notified that they have plun-
dered their citizens.' 25
D. Summary
By requiring that inverse condemnation actions be brought with a
petition for administrative mandate, the California courts subjected prop-
erty owners to harsh limitations periods, restrictive proceedings and
limited factual records which, as the cases indicate, often preclude recov-
ery. By subsuming inverse condemnation into the procedures established
for administrative mandamus, the California courts created procedural
obstacles that themselves may tend to "forc[e] some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."1
26
The rights of California property owners reached an historically low
ebb in the wake of Ham, Rossco and their progeny. The first sign that
the tide was about to turn came in early 1994 with a decision handed
down by the Second District Court of Appeal. That case, described in the
next section, is Healing v. California Coastal Commission. 27
days after the adverse administrative decision becomes final. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1094.6(d). In such cases, the time for filing the petition is extended to 30 days
following delivery of the record. Id. Of course, to take advantage of this option the
owner must be seriously considering litigation within 10 days after the administrative
action-seriously enough to bear the sometimes considerable cost of preparing the
record.
125. See, e.g., Patrick Media Group v. California Coastal Comm'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
824, 836 (Ct. App. 1992) ("a public agency's capacity to plan its actions in the public
interest and to make reasonable and responsible allocations of resources that it holds
in trust for the public requires that the agency be alerted promptly both when its
decisions are questioned, and when, as a result of a particular decision, the agency
may be liable for inverse condemnation damages.").
126. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining what the Tak-
ings Clause was designed to prevent).
127. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994).
V. LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL:
HEALING V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
In 1977, Kenneth Healing bought a two and a half acre lot in the
Santa Monica Mountains overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Healing planned
to build a modest single-story home on the site for his family-but he
failed to reckon with the California Coastal Commission.
Healing's lot seemed like an ideal homesite. The property was zoned
for residential development and was located close to existing homes,
paved streets, and utility hookups. Nevertheless, an owner within
California's Coastal Zone may not build a home on his own property
without a permit from either the Coastal Commission or a local govern-
mental agency certified by the Commission."~ After twelve years of de-
lays, the Coastal Commission rejected Healing's application for a building
permit on the grounds that it could not determine the impact the struc-
ture might have on the environment."2
In 1990, Healing filed a petition for administrative mandamus and a
complaint for inverse condemnation claiming he had been deprived of
economically viable use of his homesite. Shortly thereafter, Healing's at-
torneys moved to sever the issue of takings liability from the determina-
tion of just compensation, and to set the liability issue for trial concur-
rently with the administrative writ hearing. The Coastal Commission
countered that takings liability had to be determined in the administra-
tive writ proceeding itself, not at a trial in which extrinsic evidence could
be admitted and subjected to independent review."
The trial court agreed with the Commission, holding that the takings
issues were to be resolved at the administrative mandate hearing. Deny-
ing Healing's motion to apply an independent judgment standard of re-
view, the court examined the administrative record under the deferential
substantial evidence standard and concluded there was no taking.3 '
Faced with this particularly brutal example of the consequences of
California's then-existing doctrine, the court of appeal reversed and di-
rected that Healing's petition be granted. Grappling with the underlying
constitutional issues, the Healing court veered sharply toward a policy of
greater protection for citizens subjected to expansive and predatory regu-
latory bureaucracies.'32
128. Id. at 760.
129. Id. at 762.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 762-63.
132. Id. at 758.
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A. Legitimate Regulations Can Effect a Taking
The Healing opinion firmly rejected the Coastal Commission's argu-
ment that "the legitimacy of the regulation which forms the basis of a
regulatory taking defeats the landowner's claim to just compensa-
tion.""I The court elaborated on this point at length, drawing on the Su-
preme Court's holding in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council."
In Lucas, a property owner was deprived of any reasonable use of two
beachfront lots by the adoption of South Carolina's Beachfront Manage-
ment Act. Lucas did not contest the validity of the legislation as an exer-
cise of the police power, but nevertheless sued for inverse condemna-
tion. The South Carolina Supreme Court, adopting substantially the same
argument employed by the Coastal Commission in Healing, ruled that no
taking could occur if a regulation advanced a valid governmental pur-
pose."' The United States Supreme Court reversed, confirming that the
Takings Clause is triggered "when the owner of real property [is] called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good," even if the underlying regulation is wholly legitimate."u
The Healing court applied this holding to repudiate the Coastal
Commission's argument that no cause of action for inverse condemna-
tion can be brought against a valid regulation:
Assuming Healing would concede the validity of the Coastal Act, he would nev-
ertheless be entitled to pursue his inverse condemnation claim and to an opportu-
nity to inquire into the degree of harm to public lands and resources or adjacent
private property posed by his proposed three-bedroom house; the social value of
his activities and their suitability to the locality in question; the relative ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by Healing and
the Coastal Commission; the fact that a similar use has long been engaged in by at
least three similarly situated owners of adjacent lots; and the nature of the estate
acquired by Healing in 1977, including the restrictions then imposed on his prop-
erty, to permit a determination of the nature of his estate and a finding as to
whether the use he now proposes was permissible at the time -he acquired
title."
The court also expressly recognized that invalidation or reversal of the
regulation cannot moot an aggrieved owner's inverse condemnation
claim. Even if Healing is ultimately allowed to build his home, the court
133. Id. at 766.
134. Healing, 112 S. Ct. at 2895; see supra note 11.
135. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
136. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
137. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767-68.
noted, he can still pursue a claim for temporary damages under First
English."1
B. The Right to Trial
Its formulation of the foregoing issue impelled the Healing court to
recognize that the existence and extent of takings liability must be deter-
mined at a trial with full due process protections. Administrative review
was expressly rejected as inadequate to dispose of the takings ques-
tion."i
Focusing on regulations that deprive owners of economically viable
use of their property, the court recognized the practical impossibility of
establishing a taking on the record of the administrative hearings at
which a permit application is denied. This impossibility stems both from
the limited scope and procedures of the administrative process, and from
the fact that an as-applied takings claim does not even arise until after
the hearings are concluded.'40
Noting the absence of basic due process safeguards at administrative
hearings, Healing goes on to observe that many of the facts relevant to
takings liability are irrelevant to the administrative determination of a
permit application. Consequently (as was true in the Healing case itself),
critical facts concerning the takings issue will simply not be found in the
administrative record.'"'
Moreover, the Coastal Commission lacks the statutory authority to
consider a wide range of evidence and issues relevant to inverse condem-
nation. To the contrary, "the Commission is authorized to make and
enforce rules and decide whether to grant permits. It is not an adjudica-
tory body authorized to decide issues of constitutional magnitude."'42
For all these reasons, Healing strongly affirmed that inverse condem-
nation liability arising from a regulatory taking by the Coastal Commis-
sion must be determined in a full evidentiary trial. An administrative writ
proceeding does not provide an adequate substitute forum for those
issues.
138. Id. at 764 n.6; see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that a landowner may recover "just compensation" under
the Fifth Amendment for a "temporary taking" where the land use regulation is ulti-
mately removed).
139. Id. at 768. For a discussion of the inadequacies of administrative review, see
supra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
140. Id. (citing Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir. 1989)).
141. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
142. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
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C. The Cost of Avoiding Discontinuity
From the perspective of doctrinal consistency and judicial efficiency, it
would have been better if the court had simply held that there is no
requirement of administrative mandamus in cases (such as Lucas) where
the injured owner is willing to concede the legitimacy of the regulatory
act or decision except for its failure to compensate. Hoping to avoid the
appearance of a radical break with precedent, however, the Healing
panel retained the requirement of mandamus as a procedural prerequisite
to inverse condemnation.
In reaching what the court may have regarded as a middle ground,
Healing sometimes weaved a tortured course through the morass of
California precedent. For example, the court could not evade Ham's
pronouncement that a petition for mandamus is a prerequisite to inverse
condemnation, but found nothing in Ham to support the argument that
takings liability should be determined as part of the mandate proceed-
ing." Conversely, the passages of Rossco Holdings and Patrick Media,
which appear to say exactly that, are dismissed as dicta.'"
There is certainly some merit in crafting an opinion so as to do the
minimum damage necessary to preexisting doctrine.4 ' After having
made it clear that invalidation is not required to establish takings liabili-
ty, why did Healing retain the procedural requirement of petitioning for
an administrative writ? It is possible that the court intended mandamus
proceedings to resolve challenges brought under the first prong of the
regulatory takings standard, to determine whether a* challenged regula-
tion fails "substantially [to] advance legitimate state interests."4 ' If this
was the purpose, however, it is curious that the decision's constitutional
analysis focused entirely on the second prong, discussing remedies for
deprivation of economically viable use.
143. Id. at 769.
144. Id. at 769-70.
145. Moreover, such drafting principles may minimize the threat of depublication by
the California Supreme Court. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disap-
pear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26
Loy. L.A L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1993) ("Depublication shapes the law . . .by eliminating
the depublished opinion from the body of precedent on which the law builds.").
146. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
D. A Dissonant Note: Can a Legitimate Regulation Be Invalid?
The thrust of the Healing decision completely repudiated the need to
challenge the validity of land use regulations that effect a compensable
taking. Inexplicably, however, after citing "the fallacy of the Commis-
sion's suggestion that there can be no inverse condemnation when it
enforces a valid regulation,"4 ' the Healing court went on to say:
The rule is simple-a landowner who claims that a permit condition imposed by
the Coastal Commission constitutes a taldng must first establish the invalidity of
the condition by way of a timely petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. If
he fails to do so, he has waived his inverse condemnation claim.... .4
1
What could this passage mean in the context of the Healing opinion as
a whole? Barring some bizarre typesetting error, the court seemed to be
saying that injured property owners must still go through the motions of
seeking an invalidation remedy, even while recognizing that legitimate
regulations may still give rise to an action for compensation via inverse
condemnation.
Some-though by no means all-of the mystery would be resolved
some five months later, when the California Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Hensler v. City of Glendale.'49
VI. HENSLER: THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SPLITS THE BABY
In Hensler v. City of Glendale, the California Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether a plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim was
governed by the ninety day statute of limitations set forth in Government
Code § 66499.37.'" This statute applies to "[a]ny action or proceeding to
attack, review, set aside, void or annul the decision of an advisory agen-
cy, appeal board or legislative body concerning a subdivision...."'5'
The property owner contended that his regulatory taking claim was prop-
erly governed by the five-year statute of limitations for inverse condem-
nation. 16"
In resolving this dispute, the California Supreme Court went far be-
yond the facts of Hensler and tried to weave a coherent doctrine out of
the web of regulatory takings decisions handed down by the state courts
in the years since First English. Neither property owners nor regulatory
147. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767.
148. Id. at 769.
149. 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994).
150. Id. at 1046.
151. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 66499.37 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
152. Hensler, 876 P.2d at 1047-48; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 318-19; supra note
118 and accompanying text.
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agencies will be entirely pleased by the result.
The Hensler court expressly ruled that California's five-year statute of
limitations for inverse condemnation applies only to physical invasions,
not to regulatory takings."s Regulatory takings claims must be brought
within the ninety day (or shorter) period specified in Government Code
section 66499.37, Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, and comparable
statutes.54 The rationale for this holding rested squarely on the
government's economic interests. Allowing damages for regulatory tak-
ings to accrue over a five-year period, the court implied, could threaten
local governments with "insolvency.""s
The Hensler opinion was less clear on why injured property owners
should be forced to seek an invalidation remedy-the only relief provid-
ed under the cited code sections-when the legitimacy of the regulation
may be conceded by the owner from the outset. The court's general
theme on this point seemed to be the circular argument that a regulation
that effects a taking cannot be valid unless it also provides for compen-
sation." This results in a somewhat contradictory statement of the ob-
jective of an invalidation proceeding: the property owner may collect
damages if it is shown that the regulation is "statutorily permissible and
constitutes a compensable taking."
157
Until now, it had not been suggested that a writ of administrative man-
damus is required to remedy permissible governmental actions. Another
departure from the traditional understanding of mandamus is that, under
Hensler, governmental agencies may respond to the writ by either re-
scinding their "invalid" action or retaining it and paying com-
pensation."
Having granted this much to the regulators, however, the Hensler
court turned to the plight of property owners forced into mandamus
proceedings without due process protections or adequate standards of
review. At this point the court virtually merged the Healing opinion into
153. Hensler, 876 P.2d at 1058.
154. Id. at 1046-47. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66499.37 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); CAL
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
155. Hensler, 876 P.2d at 1054.
156. Id. at 1051. In contrast, the court does not suggest that the government's phys-
ical invasions of property are invalid unless compensation is paid. In such cases
property owners have five years within which to sue for damages; no claim for inval-
idation is required. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1051-52.
its own analysis,"6 ruling that "an administrative agency is not compe-
tent to decide whether its own action constitutes a taking and, in many
cases, administrative mandate proceedings are not an adequate forum in
which to try a takings claim.""®
In which cases will administrative mandamus provide an inadequate
forum? The court was quite specific:
If the administrative hearing is not one in which the landowner has a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence relevant to the taking issue, one in which wit-
nesses may be sworn, and testimony presented by means of direct and cross-ex-
amination, the administrative record is not an adequate basis on which to deter-
mine if the challenged action constitutes a taking [Healing]."'6
This description arguably encompasses every land-use board and agency
in the state of California! Whenever such conditions exist, Hensler gives
property owners the right to litigate their takings claim in an inverse
condemnation trial joined with the administrative hearing, in which ex-
trinsic evidence is admitted and subjected to heightened review."a
The procedures set forth in Hensler, in short, require injured property
owners to rush their regulatory takings claims into court under the short
statutes of limitations applying to administrative mandamus and com-
parable actions." Once through the courthouse door, however, plain-
tiffs in most land-use cases will be able to litigate their claims under the
full evidentiary procedures and heightened standards appropriate to in-
verse condemnation.'
VII. CALIFORNIA TAINGS LAW AFrER HEALING AND HENSLER:
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The merging of inverse condemnation with administrative mandamus,
and the eventual subsumption of the former into the latter, emerged
from a line of California decisions stretching over nearly two decades.
Even with the recent clarifying influence of Healing and Hensler, the
procedural nuances of litigating regulatory takings claims will have to be
honed on a case-by-case basis over the coming months and years.
The question in greatest need of clarification surrounds the substan-
tive role-if any-of administrative mandamus proceedings when joined
with inverse condemnation actions. In both Healing and Hensler, the
courts treated the administrative writ petition as little more than a for-
159. Id. at 1052-53.
160. Id. at 1052.
161. Id. at 1052 (citing Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767-68).
162. Id. at 1053.
163. Id.
164. Id.
[Vol. 22: 99, 19941 Inverse Condemnation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
mality to force regulatory takings claims into court promptly. Once the
petition is filed, Healing frankly conceded that a mandamus hearing is
not an adequate forum to determine takings liability," and Hensler
gave the plaintiff in virtually any land-use case the right to proceed as if
she were trying the case as inverse condemnation." The overwhelming
impression is that administrative writ petitions are required in name only,
wholly for the purpose of imposing a short statute of limitations on regu-
latory takings claims.
There is at least one other plausible alternative, however, as suggested
by the following passage:
Time has shown, we think, that although a landowner may be required to exhaust
his administrative remedies by giving the Commission an opportunity to take the
appropriate action, and to pursue a petition for a writ of mandate to afford the
court an opportunity to declare a condition or a permit denial invalid, neither
of those procedures provides a satisfactory substitute for an evidentiary trial on
the takings issues."
Did the Heating court regard invalidation as a sort of "ripeness" require-
ment, comparable to administrative exhaustion?" Whether or not by
design, this purely formal function may turn out to be the only effective
role of administrative mandamus in future regulatory takings cases.
Unfortunately, whatever the plaintiff's intentions, any facts reviewed in
a mandamus proceeding may be barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel from being relitigated in a subsequent takings trial."® Presum-
ably, most future litigants will avoid res judicata problems by conducting
the writ hearing and the inverse condemnation trial concurrently, as the
plaintiff proposed to do in Healing.'70 If this is not a practicable option
in a given instance, however, the property owner will proceed at her
peril.
1f regulatory takings cases are to be pursued in anything resembling
conventional writ hearings, future courts will have to resolve formally
the question of the proper standard of review. Since Healing focused on
the right to a trial to determine takings liability, the court of appeal did
165. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
166. This point is reaffirmed in Hensler, 876 P.2d at 1043.
167. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770 (emphasis added).
168. See generally Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial
Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1992)
(addressing the Supreme Court's application of the ripeness doctrine to constitutional
property rights claims).
169. See Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
170. Id.
not directly comment on the standard of review to be employed in the
writ proceeding. 7' However, the Healing panel's language may be inter-
preted as an endorsement of the independent judgment standard, insofar
as takings-related issues arise at the writ hearing:
To win its case on the taking issue (as opposed to what it takes to prove that it
properly denies a permit in the first instance), the Coastal Commission would
have to do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the use Healing
desires is inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that
Healing's proposed use might somehow injure the land of another. The Commis-
sion, just because it says so, cannot transform private property into public proper-
ty without compensation."
If this passage applies to the writ proceeding itself, it rather plainly
rejects the deferential standard of review applied by the trial court in
Healing. On the other hand, if the cited language applies to the inverse
condemnation trial, it seems to harken back to the heightened scrutiny
requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nollan."' In any
event, the subsequent strengthening of Nollan's standards by the Su-
preme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard"4 will make it difficult for any
court to justify continuing to apply minimal scrutiny to land use regula-
tions challenged as takings, regardless of the formal cause of action.
VIII. CONCLUSION
From the time of its drafting, the Takings Clause has been a focal
point in the tension between individual freedom and governmental au-
thority. With the emergence of the modem regulatory state, this tension
has increasingly focused on regulations restricting the development and
use of private property.
California courts have traditionally resolved this tension in favor of the
state. Public agencies have been given wide latitude to impose restrictive
land use measures, while injured property owners have been virtually
deprived of the compensation remedy supposedly guaranteed by the
Takings Clause. Unfortunately, as Justice Holmes foresaw, such a policy
encourages the continual extension of regulation until all meaningful
rights of private ownership are extinguished. 5
171. Id. Similarly, the California Supreme Court neglected to deal directly with this
issue in Hensler. See Hensler, 876 P.2d at 1043.
172. Healing, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768.
173. See supra note 109.
174. See supra notes 110-12.
175. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1992) ("When this seem-
ingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappears.").
[Vol. 22: 99, 19941 Inverse Condemnation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Healing v. California Coastal Commission may mark a turning point
in California law, foreshadowing a return to greater protections for indi-
vidual property rights. By affirming the right to a trial to establish liabili-
ty for regulatory takings, Healing recognized and implemented the funda-
mental constitutional rights proclaimed by the United States Supreme
Court in First English. The incorporation of Healing's key holdings into
the Hensler decision gave explicit statewide protection to rights that
were, at best, only vaguely implied in prior opinions of the California
Supreme Court.
The rules for bringing a successful regulatory takings case in California
are still subject to broad differences in interpretation. For the first time
in many years, however, there are grounds for hope that the California
judiciary has recognized what Justice Holmes aptly noted more than
seventy years ago: "[a] strong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change."'
176. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.

